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I   Introduction
Economic inequalities are in part the domain of economics and other social 
sciences. Economists especially can give us historical and contemporary data on 
economic inequalities in almost all countries, theories about the economic and other 
social forces that increase economic inequalities, the forces that decrease them, and 
they can propose policies that would reduce or increase them. Thomas Piketty, a very 
broadly based economist and social scientist, does all these things in Capital: massive 
and impressive data about inequalities in income and wealth from two centuries in 
Europe, and more recent data for the United States, Japan, China, and other countries. 
Piketty also has theories about what increases economic inequalities: much greater 
long term rates of return for capital than rates of growth in the economy (and so lower 
rates of growth for wages), and/or low levels of literacy, education and skills; while 
the diffusion of knowledge and skills throughout the population has been the main 
long term social force for decrease of economic inequalities.  Other economists agree; 
for example, Tyler Cowen, in Average is Over, details “the race between education 
and technology”, and observes decreases in inequalities when education wins, and 
increases when technology gets way ahead of education and creates demand for greater 
skills that the many lack and only few have. Piketty’s and Cowen’s thesis about the 
role of education and skills in economic inequalities is in line with the widespread 
and common view that “education is the great equalizer,” though more accurately it 
is the greater diffusion of education among a population that correlates with lesser 
inequalities. Interestingly enough, the great increase in economic inequalities in the 
last thirty years in the United States coincides with the great increases in college and 
university tuition and other educational expenses. 
    All this is fairly clear and is becoming well known. When we ask about the 
extent of economic inequalities and the forces that increase or decrease them in the 
short and long run, we need to turn to the economists and other social scientists for the 
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answers that their empirical research reveals and confirms.
But when we ask about the fairness or justice of economic inequalities we must 
turn primarily to the political philosophers to find answers. We must still rely on the 
data and the causal theories of the economists, but these by themselves do not tell 
us what economic inequalities, if any, are just, and what unjust. Piketty himself tells 
us to be “wary of any economic determinism in regard to inequalities in wealth and 
income. The history of the distribution of wealth and income has been deeply political 
… shaped by the way economic, social, and political actors view what is just and 
unjust…” (Capital, p.20).
Sometimes the economists’ and other social theorists’ data give us comparisons 
among different societies and different historical periods, and these comparisons 
are sometimes used as if they were standards of justice, as when economists speak 
of “historical norms”. But historical norms, perhaps useful enough for economic 
diagnosis of current problems, are dubious standards of fairness, especially when 
we consider that historically injustices and unfairness may have been at least as 
prevalent as their opposites, if not much more.  Other times, economists cite very 
great inequalities in income and wealth, and proceed to suggest reforms that would 
reduce them, simply assuming that they are unfair or unjust; but this too needs to be 
discussed and not simply assumed. More generally, the economist and social scientist, 
A. Sen, defends a “comparative approach,” as distinct from  and opposed to “ideal
theory” practiced by Rawls with the concept of a “well ordered society,” and by the
ancients in their search for “the completely good city’ (Plato) or “the best constitution” 
(Aristotle). This larger controversy, about ideal theory and the comparative approach,
may be beyond the scope of this study. For our purposes it is enough to note that both
Plato and Rawls are doing ideal theory: both think that to understand and resolve
controversies about what is just and unjust in in our societies we need to investigate
and find out what justice is at a more general level; and both work toward discovering
principles of justice, and also exemplars of a just society, such as Plato’s “completely
good city” and Rawls’ “well ordered society”. In any case, it is reasonable enough to
think that when we disagree about what is just in more particular cases, it is hard to
know whether we are disagreeing about relevant facts or about what justice is, unless
we have some view of what justice is or some principles of justice. And this seems
sufficient to motivate ideal theory.
Which economic inequalities are just and which unjust depends in part on economic 
data about inequalities and causal theories about what increases and decreases them, 
but also in part on what justice is. Or, more modestly, what one reasonably thinks 
are just inequalities and what unjust depends in part on what economic information 
and theories s/he has and what s/he thinks justice is. And we shall indeed find that 
different major theories of what justice is have different views, partly as a result, of 
what inequalities are just and what unjust. 
The divide between teleological theories of justice, such as Plato’s, and social 
contract theories of justice, such as Rawls’, provides a good  frame work for studying 
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1971,in Chs. I & III details some important differences between his contract theory 
and teleological utilitarian theories). 
Now, we are not approaching directly the question, what does justice say, if 
anything, about economic inequalities. This question is very hard to try to answer, if 
it can be answered at all in that form, because it is simply very difficult to know what 
justice says in the abstract, or that she exists all by herself, or that she ever “says” 
anything. There may or may not be a Platonic Form Justice, but it does not “say” 
anything; we only know what Plato says it “says.”  Even the very concrete statue of 
justice in the back of many court rooms is silent; it says something only if we interpret 
its symbols of blindfold, balance, and sword. In this study, when we speak about what 
justice “says” about something we mean what a particular theory of what justice is 
says about that thing.          
Accordingly we shall take up the more modest question: what do major theories 
of what justice is say about the justice of economic inequalities? This question can 
be answered on the basis of studying major theories of what justice is. In this study 
we shall sketch (1) two major theories of what justice is, and (2) what they say or 
imply about the justice of economic inequalities; specifically, the teleological theory 
of Plato, and the social contract theory of Rawls. 
Economic theories and data about economic inequalities and underlying theories 
about what justice is should illuminate our major disagreements about the justice of 
particular economic inequalities. 
But this is only a partial study of the relation of justice to economic inequalities. A 
larger historical and contemporary study is needed to inform us in greater significant 
detail about what the best human brains on the subject of justice have produced about 
the justice of economic inequalities.    
II  Kinds of Inequalities 
There are many types of inequalities among human beings. One great and relevant 
division is between natural or inborn inequalities (inequalities at birth) in intelligence, 
health and strength, beauty, and generally in abilities and talents; and social inequalities 
(also at birth), in political power and in rights and privileges, economic inequalities 
in income and wealth, and cultural in family, class, and access to education. This 
division between inborn and societal inequalities is already present and used in Plato’s 
theory of justice in the Republic and resurfaces explicitly in Rawls (1971). (I think it 
is used even to a greater extent by Aristotle especially in his Politics I, elaborated by 
Rousseau in his Social Contract and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, and 
assumed by the great utilitarian writers Bentham and Mill). The uses and significance 
of this distinction in theories of justice will be discussed as we go along. But there 
is a general assumption that natural or inborn inequalities make a difference to life 
prospects in society, can be treated differently by social structures and institutions 
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(witness different social treatments of color and gender, two evident examples of 
inborn inequalities), and thus can hardly be ignored by justice since she influences 
social structures and institutions. 
Both kinds of inequalities, inborn and social, can vary in degrees or extent within 
a population: natural inequalities, from the genius to the retarded (witness the great 
range of human IQ), from the god like strong and beautiful to the ill and deformed, 
from the talented in music or painting to the inborn deaf or blind. Social inequalities 
can also vary in degree and extent in a population: political inequalities from rulers 
to ruled, from kings to slaves, from democratic rights and freedoms to totalitarian 
oppression; economic inequalities in wealth from billionaires to homeless, in wages 
from high salaried CEOs to minimum wage earners; social inequalities from the 
educated elite to illiterate migrants.
III  Justice and Natural Inequalities
What does justice say, if anything, about natural or inborn inequalities? She of 
course does not control them directly: they might be thought to be distributed by a 
“divine craftsman” (Plato), or by the immanent teleology of nature (Aristotle), or by 
random genetic variations-- in Rawls’ useful phrase, by “the natural lottery”. But, 
however they may come about, such inborn inequalities can make a great difference to 
life expectations: those born smarter, stronger or healthier, with greater imaginations 
or mathematical or artistic talents are more likely to fare well no matter what the 
structure of the society they are born into; though such inborn inequalities are hardly 
ever thought to be by themselves (as distinct from their development in society) the 
result of merit or can be thought of as desert. Justice can take a stand on such natural 
inequalities since it is her role to regulate the structure of society and its institutions, 
and different structures can influence in many different ways, even determine, how 
natural inequalities play out during lifetimes. 
What stand can justice take? She could say, hands off natural inequalities, let them 
play out as they may. Or, she might try to compensate for them or moderate their effects 
to some extent or degree, especially if she thinks they are arbitrary (not the result of 
merit) and not deserved (Rawls). Or she might blindfold some natural inequalities (say 
differences in gender, or race), institutionalize others (say, differences in intelligence), 
as Plato did, and leave yet others alone. What should she do? And why?
 There are several different answers to this question, from the Ancients to the 
Moderns. Plato’s justice institutionalizes inborn inequalities in intelligence, blindfolds 
gender, and leaves such things as height and baldness alone. Rawls explicitly 
acknowledges an important role for natural inequalities, thinks them arbitrary and 
undeserved, and his justice tries to deal with their effects democratically: by his first 
principle of justice, which does not allow any inequalities in basic rights; and by his 
second set of principles of formal equality of opportunity, fair equality of opportunity, 
and the difference principle which explicitly tries to moderate the economic effects of 
6inborn inequalities (Rawls, 1971, 74-5). 
In the last century and a half we have seen a significant increase in the inborn or 
natural inequalities that justice blindfolds: race, gender, ethnicity, and even, arguably 
inborn, sexual preference. 
When we consider these different treatments of natural inequalities, we must 
remember that the ancients and the moderns may have very different conceptions of 
nature: for many ancients including Plato and Aristotle nature is largely teleological 
and beneficent (Keyt, 2017, Ch. 1 and pp. 68-72); for the moderns far more random at 
least since Darwin; Rawls’s phrase, “the natural lottery,” as the distributor of natural 
inequalities, is no accident.
IV  Justice and Social Inequalities
Of course justice does say something about societal equalities and inequalities—
that is part of her job or role (and seen as such from Plato to Rawls). She can regulates 
political equalities and inequalities by the constitutions she decides are just, since 
constitutions determine the structure of political offices, their powers and limits, and 
the rights and freedoms of citizens. Economic systems too are within her domain, 
since they too can be just or unjust. So she has to take a stand on social inequalities, 
including economic inequalities. And what stand she takes on economic inequalities 
may well depend on, among other things, what she is and what she thinks should be 
done, if anything, about natural inequalities.
V  Justice and Economic Inequalities
A fundamental question is whether all economic inequalities are inherently unjust 
and only economic equality is just. There is considerable consensus from ancient 
times to the present that economic inequalities are not inherently unjust, or at least 
that some economic inequalities are just. We shall presently see in detail why this 
is so. But generally speaking we can distinguish several reasons why it is generally 
agreed that some economic inequalities are just. (1) Some economic inequalities are 
thought to be efficient, in so far as they provide incentives for innovation and greater 
productivity, which in turn can increase outcomes in quality or quantity or decrease 
costs; and in teleological theories it may be hard to distinguish between efficiency 
and justice; in Plato, for example, efficiency seems to be (a proper) part of his social 
justice. (2) Some economic inequalities are thought to be just in so far as they promote 
the good of the society as a whole (or even all of humanity); this is generally held by 
teleological theories, and by Plato quite explicitly as we shall see. (3) Some economic 
inequalities are thought to be just or fair in so far as they reward merit (talent, hard 
work, and/or good performance); thus when merit is unequal rewards can be unequal; 
this justification is typical of democracies (see Piketty, Ch.11, Merit and Inheritance 
in the Long Run), and it may rely on some principle of proportional equality applied 
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to the economic domain. (4) Some inequalities are thought to be just in so far as 
they make everyone better off than they would be with economic equality, and the 
less equal consent to them (in so far as they are rational). This is typical of contract 
theories and quite explicit in John Rawls, as we shall see. 
But there are considerable variations and disagreements on what economic 
inequalities are just, for what reasons, by means of what constraints, or implemented 
by what institutions. Later on, we shall  discuss briefly several major proposals, past 
and present, about what economic inequalities are just and what institutions would 
implement them.
In order to understand the relations between justice and economic inequalities we 
need to observe two distinctions: one between principles of justice and institutions 
thought to implement them; presumably the U.S. Constitution implements or embodies 
principles of democratic justice as political equality. Aristotle’s Best Constitution 
embodies his principle of political justice as proportional equality after he has 
resolved the dispute about worth (The distinction between principles and institutions 
is well reflected in the first two Parts of A Theory of Justice into “Theory” [principles 
of justice] and “Institutions” that implement the principles).
The other distinction is between principles of justice and empirical assumptions 
used to deduce consequences about economic justice.  Aristotle’s principle of justice, 
for example, as proportional equality in the distribution of offices on the basis of 
merit or worth, by itself says nothing about economic equalities or inequalities; but 
together with empirical assumptions (say, about resources needed for performing  well 
the functions of various offices) it might well imply some economic (in)equalities. 
Something similar is true of Plato’s principle of social justice in the Republic, as we 
shall see. (And the same is true of Bentham’s and Mill more general principles of total 
utility; if some economic inequalities increase total utility, they can be just, since the 
right, including the just, is what maximizes total utility). In these teleological theories 
of justice empirical assumptions are crucial and needed to discover implications for 
economic justice, and the institutions that would implement economic justice. In 
social contract theories, on the other hand, we may have principles of justice that say 
something directly about economic justice: witness Rawls’ difference principle, and 
perhaps even the principles of formal and fair equality of opportunity; though here 
too we need empirical assumptions to discover the institutions that would implement 
these principles; for example, free public education to implement the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1971, Ch. II, Section 14). 
We should also note that empirical assumptions may play an additional important 
role in arriving at or deducing principles of justice, in both teleological and social 
contract theories. Plato, for example, uses assumptions about division of labor, trade, 
and some inborn differences to arrive at his principle of social justice. Rawls uses lots 
of empirical assumptions from the social sciences to construct his original position 
and to deduce his principles of justice (Rawls, 1971, Ch. III).
Thus empirical assumptions may play a triple role: used to arrive at principles of 
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economic justice, and the institutions or rules that would implement the principles. 
These distinctions are crucial as we proceed to examine what major theories of 
justice say about economic equalities and inequalities. Accordingly (1), we begin by 
trying to identify the normative principles of justice for each theory (and sometimes 
the empirical assumptions used to arrive at these principles); and then (2) we examine 
how they use empirical assumptions in conjunction with their principles of justice to 
reach conclusions about what economic inequalities are just and the institutions that 
would implement them.
Clearly, disagreements and mistakes can be located in either (1) or (2), and where 
they are located is important in trying to correct mistakes or resolve disagreements. 
Mistakes and disagreements about (2) would be the easier to correct or resolve by 
appeal to the relevant empirical sciences. Disagreements about (1), what justice is, 
would be harder, though here too we can make some progress if we can identify 
the empirical assumptions on which the author relies to discover what justice is; so 
long as what justice is depends on empirical assumptions, theoretically it is possible 
that all disagreements about justice can be located as disagreements about empirical 
assumptions. 
VI. Plato’s Social Justice and Inequalities in the Republic  
Plato’s opposition to standard democratic justice as political equality is well 
known: democratic justice accords (political) equality to equals and unequals alike 
(Rep. Bk. VIII, 558). This criticism is more forceful than might be thought if we 
remember that his target was not our representative democracies, but participatory 
democracy in which every citizen was a ruler and subject at the same time, at least in 
the Assembly; every citizen was a ruler in the Council by rotation; and every citizen 
a ruler in the jury courts by lot; and in all three every citizen had one vote. Ancient 
participatory democracies made far greater demands on their citizens than modern 
representative democracies: to do their jobs well in the Assembly and the Council, 
even the Courts, each citizen had to be able to deliberate about his own good and, 
far more difficult, about the good of his city. Since it is highly unlikely that every 
citizen could do this equally well, why should they all have equal claims or rights to 
do so? Being equally free, i.e., the sons of one or both of citizen parents, seems hardly 
enough.
Having given up justice as political equality, Plato tries to discover what political 
inequalities are just, a big problem once political equality is given up, since there 
are many kinds and degrees of political inequalities; indeed all the constitutions he 
considers, other than democracy, allow or require political inequalities. 
His theory of political virtue, summed up in his theory of the four virtues of the ideal 
city-state (as distinct from his theory of the four corresponding virtues of individuals), 
is also well known.  But these city virtues – social wisdom, social temperance, social 
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courage, and social justice-- say nothing directly, by themselves, about economic 
justice, that is, about the distribution of land, other wealth, and income. For this and 
other reasons, his theory of the relation between justice and economic equalities and 
inequalities is less well known, and analysis of it should clarify and enrich his theory 
of social justice. Here he was in partial agreement with standard democratic theory, 
ancient and modern, in so far as it allows economic inequalities, sometimes very great 
ones; but for different reasons and with different constraints.
Plato does not have the democratic problem of reconciling possible conflicts 
between political equality and economic inequality.  But he still has to discover what 
economic inequalities are just, an even bigger problem for justice once economic 
equality has been given up, since there are many kinds and degrees of economic 
inequalities and many other kinds of inequalities that influence economic ones. 
Some of his proposals are quite radical, and seemingly undemocratic in so far as they 
threaten democratic freedoms; and his reasons for moderating economic inequalities 
are different from democracy’s standard reasons. 
We propose to look at Plato’s treatment of three cases of inequality and their 
relation to his justice: (1) The inequality in the distributions of the social careers of 
ruling, defending, and providing for the ideal city, based in part on the natural or 
inborn inequalities in the distribution of intelligence, spirit, and talents and abilities 
for the productive arts; this is the center of Plato’s theory of political justice. (2) His 
treatment of other inborn inequalities in such things as height, baldness, color, and 
gender; this, together with (1) helps us understand some of Plato’s “naturalism,” the 
stand his justice takes on inborn or natural inequalities. And (3) economic inequalities 
in land, other wealth, and income, as well as the institutions that implement them.
Plato’s principle of political justice (the justice of the polis) is stated in Bk. IV, 
433a, a passage that harks back to its first statement in Bk. II and subsequent statements 
in between: “What we laid down in the beginning… when we were forming our city, 
this I think… is justice. And what we did laid down, and often said … was that each 
person must perform the one social service in the state for which his nature was best 
adapted.” (Shorey, transl.)
What they laid down in the beginning: “The result, then, is that more things are 
produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according 
to his nature, at the right moment and at leisure from other occupations.” (R. 370c, 
Shorey). This is Socrates’ grand conclusion from several premises: that individuals 
come together to form cities because they are not individually self-sufficient; that each 
has many needs (“its [the city’s] real creator is our needs”), and each thinks it better for 
himself if he engages in interchanges of giving and taking; that their basic economic 
needs are food, shelter, and clothing; that they would all be better off if they divide 
their labors, rather than each dong everything; and that they are born with different 
capabilities for producing or doing different things. Plato’s principle of social justice, 
(a limited in scope version of it) is embedded in the grand conclusion. The conclusion 
itself is a good indication that Plato’s theory of justice is a teleological ethical theory: 
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the statement asserts that (what he later identified as) his justice promotes the good 
of everyone because its practice produces “more and better” and easier the goods for 
their basic needs.
Later of course the needs are expanded to two other groups, defense and ruling, 
and the grand conclusion is made to include them as well: so we have three groups 
of careers that the principle of justice covers. And also later, basic education for all 
citizens, and higher education appropriate to higher inborn abilities and careers, are 
added. So that a more complete, but still formal, statement of Plato’s principle of 
social justice is: A city is just when it is so organized that each citizen is doing that 
social task, of ruling or defending or provisioning the city, for which s/he is best suited 
by inborn ability and appropriate education.
Content to the principle is added in Bks. II, III, and IV by several empirical 
assumptions. Plato tries to work out what inborn abilities are most suitable for each of 
the three main tasks or functions: inborn high intelligence for ruling, inborn high spirit 
for defense, and inborn abilities or talents for providing food, shelter, and clothing. The 
Myth of the Metals (Republic, 414-5) illustrates his strong but largely true empirical 
assumption that persons are born with significantly different intelligence, spirit, and 
abilities for the arts, and that these make a big difference to the best functioning of 
his utopia.   He also works up what educations, in addition to a public and free basic 
education for all citizens, would be most suitable for these three types of careers: a 
very advanced education in the sciences and dialectic for the rulers, basic education 
and military training and tests for the defenders, and the standard arts for farming and 
building and weaving. 
Several features are noteworthy about Plato’s principle of social justice. In scope 
it covers all social careers, including the important ones of ruling and defense, 
something we might well expect a principle of social justice to cover. Plato’s principle 
also forbids multi-careering as well as choosing a career one is not suited for either by 
inborn ability or by education. In this respect, it is opposed to free choice of career, as 
left open, for example, by justice in Rawls’ principle of formal equality of opportunity 
or careers legally open to talents. In Rawls’ “well ordered society” (and indeed in all 
existing democratic societies) choosing a career one is not fitted for, by inborn ability 
or education, may be foolish, imprudent or irrational, but it would not be unjust, as 
it would be in Plato’s utopia. Plato’s principle, we might say, institutionalizes (some 
relevant) inborn inequalities as a basis for just inequalities in the distribution of 
careers. Rawls’ justice, supposing that inborn inequalities are arbitrary or undeserved, 
far from institutionalizing them, tries to neutralize or moderate them or compensate 
for their effects.       
We know from his treatment of gender that Plato’s justice does not institutionalize 
all inborn inequalities among human beings. It leaves some inborn inequalities, 
such as height and baldness out as irrelevant, at least to the choice and performance 
of social careers. And it takes account of the inborn differences in gender: not by 
institutionalizing them, as it does with inborn intelligence, and not by ignoring them, 
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as it does with height or baldness; but by blindfolding them. In his account of the 
role of women in his utopia (Bk. V, 445-57), Plato proceeds, first, by distinguishing 
between inborn features that make a difference to the performance of the three main 
social careers and those that do not, and, second, argues that though men and women 
do indeed differ by nature, these differences –women bear children and men do not, 
and by and large men are physically stronger than women—do not make a difference 
in the performance of careers. Finally, he claims that the three main inborn traits—
high intelligence, high spirit, and high abilities for arts and trades—that do make a 
difference (together with suitable education) in the performance of the three main 
social tasks, are distributed indifferently between men and women; some women are 
born smarter than some men, some with higher spirit, and some with “a physician 
soul;” and this more than twenty centuries before the Johns Hopkins Medical School 
admitted the first woman! We might say that, far from institutionalizing gender 
differences—as nearly all laws did in Plato’s time—his justice blindfolds gender. In 
all likelihood, his revolutionary proposal is a case of procedural justice, rather than 
a justice of outcomes that might result in quotas of equal men and women in ruling, 
defense, and the arts. And it was likely made possible by his metaphysical dualism 
of body and soul, and his idea that gender is an attribute of the body, while the three 
inborn features his justice institutionalizes are attributes of a soul, a soul that can be 
disembodied (For much more discussion of Plato’s treatment of gender see Santas, 
20010, Ch. 6). 
 VII. Inequalities in Property and Wealth in the Republic   
  
In Bk. III Socrates proposes that in the ideal city the ruling class and the military 
class not be allowed any private property or wealth, only shelter, food, clothing and 
other bare necessities for living and doing their tasks. (R. 412-19, and Cornford, Ch. 
X) Thus, the two classes with all the power in the city, the rulers and the military, will 
be deprived of one major instrumental good people usually want and go after. And 
an absolute firewall is created between government and wealth, a complete divorce 
between political power and wealth, the very opposite of oligarchy,
His reasons for this can be traced back to his criticism of Thrasymachus’ view that 
rulers govern for their own benefit, rather than the benefit of their subjects. But even 
if his criticism there (Bk. I, 341-2), the argument by analogy against Thrasymachus, is 
correct, and like medicine and navigation the aim of ruling is the good of the subjects, 
it is quite another thing to insure that the rulers of his ideal city do not rule for their 
own benefit rather than the benefit of the subjects. So how is he going to guard against 
that widespread tendency of rulers?
His answer is: first, education, and second, abolition of private property and wealth 
for the rulers and the military. The education consists in instilling into the guardians, 
i.e., the defenders and the future rulers, the belief that their own good or interest is 
the same as the good or interest of their subjects. If they are convinced of that, then 
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presumably they will act in favor of their subjects, and in that respect ruling will be 
like medicine and navigation. But after he has finished his sketch of their education, 
including tests of this conviction, Socrates now implies (R. 415-19) that all this 
education may not be enough for acting in the interests of their subjects; that is, not 
enough if they still have private property and private wealth; because this will create 
conflicts between their own economic good and that of their subjects. So Socrates 
proceeds beyond cognitive and other education, to the abolition of private motives 
(economic gain) by abolishing their private objects (private property and wealth). 
This is Plato’s solution to the political problem posed brilliantly by Thrasymachus, the 
opposition Plato himself set up.  As R.E. Allen points out (Allen, 2006, x-xv), Plato 
tries to eliminate the causes of faction, instead of trying to control their effects as the 
fathers of the American Constitution did.
When Adeimantus objects, in the opening lines of Bk. IV (R. 419-21) , that 
Socrates’ reform would make the rulers and soldiers unhappy, by depriving them of 
the usual goods that the ruling classes go after-- property, and wealth, and fine houses, 
and money for travel and mistresses, the things that are commonly thought to make 
people happy—Socrates replies that he would not be surprised if even so the ruling 
classes were “most happy”, especially if they did their work well. Here he seems to 
assume that an important source or means to happiness derives from doing well what 
one is best at. But in any case, Socrates adds, contra Thrasymachus, they did not set 
out to promote the happiness of any one class particularly well, but to promote the 
happiness of the city as a whole, because they thought only in that city they would find 
justice. This seems to assume that justice promotes the good of the city as a whole, and 
that abolition of private property and wealth for the rulers and defenders will promote 
the good of the city as a whole.  But though in the passage it is clear that Socrates 
disagrees with the common conception of happiness, it is not equally clear how his 
principle of social justice specifically excludes private property for the ruling classes. 
In Bk. V (R. 462-5), Socrates gives another reason for abolishing private property 
and wealth in the two ruling classes: if they had it they would have conflicts of 
interest with each other, and thus create faction and possibly civil war. This danger, 
faction within the ruling classes, was perhaps as real as faction between rulers and 
subjects. And perhaps this is the reason why Socrates claims that unity in the city, 
which excludes both kinds of faction, is its greatest good, and faction its greatest evil, 
something new in his list of goods and evils, at least in rankings. Apparently, the virtue 
of social temperance—agreement among the citizens about who should rule and who 
should be ruled--  the virtue that promotes harmony between rulers and ruled and even 
between rulers and the military, presumably the result of education, is not enough to 
prevent faction and even civil war. Institutions are needed in addition to education, 
and the abolition of private property and wealth for the ruling classes, as well as the 
abolition of the private family among them, will eliminate private economic motives 
and even private affection as well among them.
In sum, in these radical institutional reforms, Plato creates an absolute firewall 
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between property and wealth on the one hand and political and military power on 
the other.  By comparison, our democratic firewalls between political and economic 
power, e.g. blind trusts, campaign contribution limits and financial disclosures, are far 
weaker and apparently ineffective. These reforms are quite radical by comparison also 
to all the other constitutions Plato discusses in Bk. VIII; indeed one of them, oligarchy 
or plutocracy, far from separating ruling and wealth, unites them.
Now clearly, the abolition of private property and wealth for the upper classes is 
not economic equality among all citizens. Nor does it seem to be an instance of his 
principle of social justice as proportional equality applied to income and wealth. Nor 
yet can it be the role of his other city virtues to regulate economic goods. So how do 
the reasons he gives connect at all with his social philosophy of the four civic virtues? 
And if they do not, as they do not appear to be, to what principles do his proposals or 
his reasons for them connect?
The answer may be that these reforms promote the good of the city as a whole, 
and particularly that they enable the rulers to rule the city well, that is, for the good of 
the citizens, contra Thrasymachus, and the defenders to defend the city well, that is, to 
defend the citizens against external threats and not to harm their own fellow citizens. 
This may be the main thrust of Socrates’ answer to Adeimantus objection in Bk. IV: 
the city as a whole will perform better with these reforms, and even the ruling classes 
can be happy with them if they do their job well.  So here we may not have a direct 
appeal to his principle of distributive justice, since abolition of private property for the 
two classes is not an example of proportional inequality, but to his overall teleological 
principle that the right (including the just) is what promotes the good. 
   Plato’s principle of political justice connects to these reforms rather indirectly: 
the division of social tasks and the matching of tasks to native talent and appropriate 
education (social justice) was adopted because these tasks could then be done better; 
abolition of private property for the two ruling classes enables these two tasks to be 
done better yet, indeed best. In addition, abolition of private property and wealth 
for the classes with the most power avoids faction and promotes a great good, unity. 
One might reasonably think that another great civic good has been added to the four 
virtues, civic unity.  
The rest of the ideal city, the vast majority of its citizens, are allowed private 
property and a free market of exchanges and trades. But Socrates proposes that there 
be economic floors and ceilings (R. 421-27). His main reasons are that farmers and 
craftsman must have enough materials and instruments in order to do their work well, 
provisioning the ideal city well, but not allowed so much property and wealth that 
they lose their motivation to do what they are best suited by nature and education. 
Plato’s proposal is rather vague; functional economic floors and ceilings may vary 
considerably; farmers may need far more materials and instruments than, say, 
shoemakers.
Once more, this is not economic equality; nor is it an immediate implication of the 
principle of justice as proportional equality applied to income and wealth: economic 
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floors and ceilings are not economic equality or proportional ecomomic inequality. 
And once more his reasons seem to be that the farmers and craftsmen will do their 
work better with these floors and ceilings than they would otherwise. The best 
functioning of his city, presumably a superlative good, is appealed to directly, rather 
through his principle of social justice as proportional equality. One may wonder why 
this is the case. Is his virtue of social justice incomplete? It would seem so, since the 
restriction of his social justice to the distribution of careers, and nothing else at least 
directly, leaves the distribution of economic goods wide open as an issue of justice. 
In sum, Plato does not propose economic equality for his ideal city, and once he 
departs from equality he does not rely on his principle of social justice as proportional 
equality to regulate economic inequalities, but instead appeals directly to the good of 
the city as a whole or its unity or to the best performance of its main social functions.
VIII   Equality and Inequalities in Plato’s Laws
But in the Laws (Bks. V, VI, and Bobonich, 2002, Ch. 5, pp. 374-94), where Plato 
constructs his second best city (Laws,739-47), he is by no means averse to political or 
economic equality. His program is a measured mixture of fundamental political and 
economic equalities and moderate inequalities.
Unlike the ideal city of the Republic, where the defenders and the artisans are 
permanently excluded from political office, the second best city extends citizenship 
to all who have fought for the city or who can afford arms, and basic political power 
equally to all citizens by means very similar to the institutions of participatory 
democracy: an Assembly, in which all citizens participate and each citizen has one vote, 
the Council in which aa citizens participate by rotation, and the Courts; and several 
other, perhaps less democratic institutions, such as appeals courts, the guardians of 
the laws, and the nocturnal council. The first three seem clearly modeled after, or at 
least similar to, the corresponding institutions of participatory democracy (for some 
innovations in the Council and the Courts, see Bobonich, 379-82), and Plato himself 
characterizes this second best city as a mixture of democracy and monarchy (Laws, 
691-93. Aristotle interestingly claims that it is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy; 
Pol. II, 6). So unlike the ideal city of the Rep., where great and permanent inequalities 
are Plato’s solution to the problem of distribution of political offices, in the second 
best city the solution to the same problem is largely political equality—obviously a 
prevalent democratic solution. And his principle of justice in the Rep., as proportional 
distribution in the main three tasks or social functions of the city on the basis of native 
ability and appropriate education, seems to be abandoned among the citizens; all are 
allowed to multi task, at least in defending and ruling the city (Laws, 735-7). 
  Of course if we consider the whole population of the second best city, we find 
nothing but political inequalities between citizens and others: slaves, resident aliens, 
and others are excluded from citizenship and ruling. Even women, who are allowed 
citizenship and office, are allowed these things by different standards for citizenship 
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(not fighting or affording arms), and at later times in their lives (than males) for office 
(Laws, 804, 814). Of course these inequalities, and even more in the case of women, 
were also present in the current participatory democracies.
   When we come to the problem of the distribution of economic goods, land and 
other wealth, Plato solution in the Laws (Bk. V, 740-46) is equality of land, and very 
measured, or moderate, inequality in other wealth. His citizens (actually households) 
are allotted equal parcels of land, one near the center one near the borders, presumably 
to motivate every citizen to defend the city or its borders; and they are not allowed 
to divide or aggregate their lots, so this fundamental economic equality, fundamental 
since land was the major part of wealth, is preserved forever. They are allowed unequal 
“movable goods” (though not in essential instruments for cultivating the land, or in 
gold or silver). But this inequality is constrained by a specific distance between the 
richest and the poorest: no one is allowed more in movable goods than four times 
the value of the equal land plots; partly as a result, four different “property classes” 
emerge, one four times the equal land, one three times, one two, and one equal to the 
value of the land plots. 
Some of the less democratic upper offices, such as the guardians of the laws and 
the nocturnal council, are distributed on the basis of this economic inequality of the 
four property classes—perhaps why Aristotle thinks that this constitution is partly 
oligarchic.       
Thus the economic inequality is constrained by specific economic floors, which 
exclude poverty among the citizens, and specific economic ceilings which exclude 
excessive wealth. Unlike Plato’s vagueness and variability of his functional economic 
floors and ceilings for the artisan class in the Rep., in the Laws there is a unit, the value 
of the equal plots of land, that sets the floor, and a definite distance from it that sets the 
ceiling. Clearly a very different economic program than that of the Republic. Unlike 
the ideal city of the Rep., in which the two ruling classes are deprived of private 
property and any wealth, in the Laws no citizen is deprived of private property. And 
unlike this fundamental economic inequality in the earlier work and the constrained 
inequality among the artisan class, in the Laws we have a fundamental equality in the 
distribution of land. 
If we ask why Plato now chose fundamental political and economic equalities 
as the solution to the problem of the distribution of important offices and of land, 
and moderation where he allowed inequalities (see Laws,736-7, where moderation, a 
middle range between extremes is praised), he tells us three times that it is to avoid 
faction, conflicts of interest among the citizens.  (Laws, 728-9, 736, 744-5). Inequalities 
among the citizens are a source of faction, especially excessive inequalities. And 
fundamental political and economic equalities are a partial solution to the problem of 
faction. Once more, this is in contrast to the Rep, where he chose economic inequality, 
as a solution to the conflict between rulers and ruled, and then claimed that even 
with such fundamental economic inequality his rulers and defenders could still be 
happy and content.  And in contrast to the fundamental political inequality of the 
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earlier work, and the emphasis on education in social temperance -- agreement to the 
inequality—as the remedy.
If we ask in turn why Plato thought that he could now chose the democratic solution 
to the political problem of distribution of office, equality by means of democratic 
participatory institutions, the answer may be more complex. Bobonich (2002, 374, 
and Ch. 4), who concentrates and deals ably with this problem, says that it is partly 
due to changes in Plato’s conception of human nature and thus his moral psychology, 
and changes in his epistemology.  Indeed when Plato describes the best constitution 
in the Laws (739d), clearly that of the Rep., he says that it would be a constitution 
for gods or the sons of gods.  For men as they are Plato now designs the second best 
constitution. More persons are now thought to be capable of ruling well, not just those 
born and educated to be philosopher kings and can know the form of the good; but 
that is partly because less is required for ruling well. In the second best constitution 
Plato has given up his demand that citizens and legislators need to know the form of 
the good in order to rule well; perhaps he has given up entirely his elevated view of 
the form of a cosmic good. He must now think that all those who are citizens in his 
second best city can, with appropriate education, understand what is good for them 
and what is good for the city; especially understand the three main human goods, 
of the soul, of the body, and of property, and the priorities among them: the soul, or 
its virtues, is the greatest good, the body, or its health and strength and beauty, the 
second, and land and wealth the third; and that all other goods are to be pursued for 
the sake of the goods of the soul (Laws, 729-30; these goods and their priorities are 
largely the same as those of Socrates in the Gorgias; see Santas, 1979, pp. 251-2). 
This is explained to the citizens in the prelude to the laws. What is good for persons 
and what is good for the city could be understood accordingly by all citizens. (For the 
lower epistemic standards for citizens and legislators, see also Susan Sauve Meyer, 
in Benson, pp. 380-87. According to Meyer, Plato in the Laws gave up not only the 
demand for knowledge of the form of the good, but also the demand for Socratic 
definitions of the virtues and the good. Citizens can be virtuous if they only have 
stable true beliefs about what is good and bad, what just and unjust, and what fine and 
shameful, as distinct from knowledge of the forms of justice and of the good and of 
their definitions).
IX   The Problem of Economic Justice and Possible Solutions, Past and 
Present. 
 
The problem of economic justice is the division and distribution of economic 
assets, such as land and other wealth, and income. Such  divisible assets can be 
distributed (arithmetically) equally, or unequally in several different ways. 
  In Plato we have already seen the equality solution, in the equal division of land 
in his second best city. And we have also seen several inequality solutions : the radical 
inequality of the abolition of private property for rulers and the military; the restrain 
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of inequalities of income and wealth by functional economic floors and ceilings where 
he allows private property; specific distance between the richest and the poorest in his 
second best city; and finally, justice as proportional inequality in the distribution of 
careers in his best city.
It should be noted at once that the equality and the proportional inequality solutions 
are based on principles: (arithmetically) equal division and distribution as just; or 
unequal division and distribution of some advantage or burden in proportion to some 
unequal attribute of the persons to whom distribution is made; and though there is 
disagreement about what that attribute should be, the claim is that such proportional 
inequality is just.       
But the other two inequality solutions do not seem off hand to have a principle 
supporting them: they presuppose inequalities and impose constraints on them, but 
why are such constraints just? And perhaps partly for that reason, they can be vague, 
variable, and much in dispute. What is a just economic floor, or a just economic 
ceiling? And what is a just distance between the richest and the poorest in wealth, or 
in income? 
Remarkably enough, all of Plato’s solutions to the problem of economic justice 
find an echo in modern representative democracies.      
In contemporary times, economic floors and ceilings, in wealth or wages, are quite 
common in many nation states. In wages, economic floors in the form of minimum 
wage laws, and various other so called “safety nets” such as welfare, food stamps, have 
become a common way to mitigate economic inequalities. But interestingly there is no 
such thing as maximum wages, as a matter of law rather than historical circumstance, 
at least not in cardinal values as minimum wages are set. In contemporary democracies 
law seems to set the minimum wage, but it sets no maximum wage; and the markets 
set no maximum wage, except in a narrow comparative sense (i.e. among peers), and 
even that can be variable.  In wealth, as distinct from wages, economic floors and 
ceilings are harder to find and are never set in cardinal values; inheritance or estate 
taxes seem to be the main device used for ceilings, presumably to moderate great 
concentrations of wealth over generations. Economic floors in wealth may be very 
rare in societies, at least so long as they allow homelessness, since being homeless is 
usually good evidence that there is no wealth.    
We saw that Plato uses proportional inequality for the distribution of all careers. 
Among the moderns we also find proportional equality as a principle for some economic 
justice. Rawls used proportional inequality in the distribution of opportunities: given 
that his principle of formal equality of opportunity (careers legally open to talents) is 
satisfied, his fair equality of opportunity principle requires, at least procedurally, that 
those with equal talents and an equal willingness to develop and use them are to have 
equal life prospects; and he proposed free public education as the main institution for 
implementing it procedurally. (Rawls, 1971, Ch. II, Section 14).
Proportional inequality is certainly a principled way to try to determine what 
economic inequalities are just. Of course there can be dispute about the basis of the 
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proportion: equal or unequal distribution of income or wealth on the basis of what? 
E.g. need, talent, hard work, actual contribution to some common good?  
Interestingly enough there is large consensus to use proportional inequality in at 
least one economic domain, the distribution of the burden of taxation; presumably 
to cover the cost of government and defense, and perhaps to reach fairness by some 
redistribution. Income taxes are determined in proportion to income; indeed by what 
we might call a double proportion, percentages of income, and different brackets that 
set different percentages. And there is debate about having different brackets: taxes 
based on percentages with the same bracket for all are said to be “regressive” and 
argued to be unfair (e.g. sales taxes); while percentages and different brackets are said 
to be “progressive” and more fair (e.g. income taxes and estate taxes). 
Regulating the distance between the economically best and worst off, as a way of 
mitigating great economic inequalities seen as unjust, is very popular now, as can be 
seen in the constant comparisons made between the average salaries of managers of 
large firms and the average wage of their employees. Especially since the 1980s in the 
United States, this inequality has increased from the managers having salaries roughly 
twenty times that of their employees to a staggering two hundred times in 2012. This 
is seen as unjust since hardly anyone contends that there was a similar increase in the 
managers’ merit, their efficiency, productivity or hard work—the main argument used 
in democracies that such inequalities are just; an argument that hints that proportional 
inequality may be a principle underlying the regulation of such economic distances 
(see especially Piketty, Capital,  Ch. 8, Two Worlds, and Chs. 9, 10 & 11, especially 
pp. 418-22).
Needless to say, there is continuing controversy about what the distance should 
be (or is fair) between the richest and the poorest, whether measured in income from 
labor or in wealth. Piketty has the most comprehensive data about how this distance 
has varied over two  centuries in Europe, two centuries in the United States, and 
more recently in Japan and China. His review throws very considerable doubt on any 
attempt to use the inequalities of any one period or nation as a “historical norm” for 
judging the fairness of economic inequalities (as distinct from their efficiency).
X. John Rawls’ Solution to the Problem of Just Economic Inequalities.
Another principled way to try to determine what economic inequalities are just is 
by a general principle congenial to contract theories of justice and democratic cultures: 
economic inequalities are just provided they are to everyone’s advantage; and, social 
contract theories add, everyone, especially the less economically equal, would agree 
or consent to them in so far as they are rational. Thus economic inequalities are 
just so long as everyone is better off with the inequalities than s/he would be with 
equality. We start with economic equality as presumably or prima facie just, but allow 
departures from it, and thus inequalities, so long as everyone is better off with such 
inequalities than they would be with the corresponding equality; presumably, we 
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allow even greater inequalities so long as everyone is better off with them than s/he 
would be with the previous and lesser inequality.
This is how John Rawls begins his discussion of his principles of justice in Ch. 
II (Rawls, 1971). His two principles of justice, he says, “are a special case of a more 
general conception of justice that can be expressed as follows:
“All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of 
self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distributions of any, or 
all, of these values are to everyone’s advantage. Injustice, then is simply inequalities 
that are not to the benefit of all.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 62). He adds that the initial equality 
provides “a benchmark for judging improvements.”
Ralws has a long argument, well analyzed step by step by Barry (1989, pp. 217-26) 
for equality being presumed just and serving as a benchmark for judging (explaining 
and justifying) economic inequalities. We are not concerned primarily with equality, 
but it is worth noting that Rawls’  fundamental basis for benchmark equality, as 
just to begin with, is his view that inequalities at birth are arbitrary, without merit, 
undeserved, and so have no claim on justice (Rawls, 1971, pp.7, 74-5, 92). This for 
social inequalities at birth; and also for natural inequalities at birth, in stark contrast 
to Plato’s (and Aristotle’s) view that some natural inequalities at birth have a claim 
on justice (and must be taken into account in designing institutions) because they are 
necessary or effective for the good performance of essential functions of the city-state. 
But aside from Rawls’ fundamental reason for starting with equality as presumably 
just and using it as a benchmark, we have seen that the equality solution is very old, 
and that even Plato gives other reasons for preferring basic economic equality, namely 
the avoidance of faction—, quarrels and even civil war over inequalities. So there seem 
to be many reasons for starting with equality as presumably just, and for demanding 
reasons for departing from it and accepting particular inequalities as just, reasons 
that everyone can accept and especially the less equal. Equality as justice is innocent 
until proven guilty, and the burden of proof is on any given inequality proposed as 
just. Even if we supposed equality to be on an initial par with any inequalities for 
the title of justice, still comparison between equality and various inequalities can be 
enlightening. After all there is only one arithmetic equality (sameness in number or 
size, as Aristotle defines it, Politics, 1301b29-30, Keyt, 2017, p.12) of, say, income 
and wealth, and an indefinite number of inequalities; we can still use the equality and 
distances from it to simply systematize the discussion.
Now,  as is well known, Rawls divides all social values (what he calls “primary 
goods”—major instrumental goods, things that it is rational to want no matter what 
else one wants, (Rawls, 1971, pp. 62,92)), along with his division of the basic structure 
of society into political and socio-economic, into liberty on the one hand, which is to 
be distributed absolutely equally, and opportunities and income and wealth, on the 
other, which can be distributed unequally so long as the inequalities are to everyone 
one’s benefit. And the main problem he takes up in the rest of the chapter is how to 
interpret this all important proviso, “to every one’s advantage,” the satisfaction of 
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which confers justice to socio economic inequalities. 
Rawls has a very informed discussion, logically and historically, of various 
attempts to satisfy this proviso. Is an inequality in opportunities or in wages or in 
wealth just, for example, if it can be shown that it promotes the common interest or 
the good of the society as a whole?           
Teleological ethical theories, those of Plato, Aristotle, Bentham and J.S. Mill, for 
example, would tend to interpret the proviso in this way. But there are difficulties 
defining the common good or the good of the society as a whole. If it is defined, for 
example, as an aggregate or sum total of all the interests or good of all the citizens, 
as would seem to be the case with Mill’s and Bentham’s principle of total utility, 
it might allow for Pareto optimal outcomes to satisfy the proviso: so long as some 
gain in utility and nobody loses we have Pareto improvements. The principle of total 
utility seems even to allow some to win and some to lose, so long as the total gains 
exceed the total losses. Bentham’s “greatest good for the greatest number,” a two 
factor principle, may allow for both kinds of inequality: Pareto optimal outcomes 
(some winners and no losers), and winners and losers with a net gain.     The 1789 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man, Article 1, says that, equality being the norm, 
inequality is acceptable only if based on “common utility.” This too would be open to 
the same objections, unless “common utility” is interpreted broadly, as for example, 
Piketty interprets it: “social inequalities are acceptable only if they are to the interests 
of all and in particular of the most disadvantaged social groups.” (Piketty, 480). This 
interpretation of course leans in Rawls’ direction, as Piketty himself acknowledges.
Social contract theories would object to both outcomes, simply Pareto optimal 
outcomes, and winners and losers with a net gain, as satisfying the proviso. 
  Rawls, arguably the most able recent defender of contract theories and the 
democratic culture, argues that we need all his principles to satisfy the proviso, 
especially his second principle which is really three distinct principles: given that his 
principle of equal maximum basic rights and freedoms (first principle) is satisfied, 
formal equality of opportunity, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle 
(these three make up his so called second principle) would have to satisfied; all in that 
order, what he calls lexical ordering or lexical priority, which does not allow trade 
offs between liberty and other primary goods (opportunities and income and wealth). 
The principle of formal equality of opportunity is the simplest: all careers are 
legally open to talents. It should be noted that not all societies satisfy this principle. 
In ancient Greece, for example, ruling and defending the city were not legally open to 
women; in Plato’s ideal city these careers are legally open to women.  Caste societies 
and many oligarchic societies violate this principle. So formal equality of opportunity 
is an important equality—equality before the law of access to careers.(Rawls, 1971, 
Ch. II, Section 12). It should also be noted that formal equality of opportunity leaves 
open the choice of career; but it does not require matching careers to talents as a 
matter of justice, as Plato’s principle of justice does.
The principle of fair equality of opportunity goes further: it requires, procedurally, 
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not in outcomes, that those with equal talents and equal willingness to develop and 
use them have equal prospects of success; those with unequal talents or unequal 
willingness to develop or use them are to have proportionally unequal prospects of 
success (Rawls, 1971, p.73). This seems to be a principle of proportional equality (an 
equality of ratios, not an arithmetical equality) applied procedurally to opportunities. 
The main institutional procedure for implementing this principle, Rawls says, is 
public and free education for all. (Rawls, 1971, pp. 83-90). 
These two principles, of formal and fair equality of opportunity, make up Rawls’ 
interpretation of the great democratic and especially American dream of “equality 
of opportunity,” a dream often appealed to in political debates but rarely explained. 
Neither principle nor their conjunction insures or requires that all opportunities are 
arithmetically equal for all; no such thing may be possible. An opportunity, Brian 
Barry tells us (in Political Argument), is a circumstance favorable to one’s interests. 
So, presumably, all may have an arithmetically equal opportunity to do something 
when there is some circumstance that is equally favorable to every one’s interests. It 
would be difficult enough to find a single circumstance favorable to all, not to mention 
a socio-economic arrangement in which all opportunities are equally favorable 
to all. Rawls’ two principles seem to be confined to opportunities for careers, not 
all opportunities. Formal equality simply insures that no one is legally barred from 
choosing and pursuing any career. And his fair equality levels the playing field 
procedurally in the competition for careers, by making free public education available 
to all. These two principles and free public education, Rawls claims, moderate the 
effects of social inequalities at birth, such as being born into affluent or poor families, 
which he regards as arbitrary or without merit or undeserved. 
The difference principle is a more complicated affair and has been the subject 
of much controversy. It allows the economic expectations of the most advantaged 
groups (or representative positions) to be increased so long as, and no more than, the 
expectations of the least advantaged are also increased. This principle is supposed 
to moderate inequalities in income and wealth, which in part result from natural or 
inborn inequalities at birth, such as inborn inequalities in intelligence and talents and 
abilities, which Rawls regards as also arbitrary, without merit, or underserved—the 
result, as he says, of “the natural lottery.” This principle does not eliminate inequalities 
in income and wealth; on the contrary, it presupposes them, and tries to moderate them 
so that they are fair.
The difference principle differs from Pareto optimality (when applied to 
distribution): the latter is satisfied when it is impossible to change a distribution so 
that at least one person gains without any one losing; when at least one can gain 
without any other losing we have a so called Pareto improvement (Rawls, 1971 p. 
67). Rawls thinks this is not enough for justice (Rawls, 1971, p.71, and Note 10 where 
he cites economists agreeing that efficiency must be supplemented by equity), and 
certainly not enough to satisfy the proviso about every one gaining from inequalities. 
When we depart from benchmark equality, we can imagine a series of alternative 
22
Pareto improvements, by increasing the expectations of anyone class without 
decreasing those of the others, till we reach the so called Pareto frontier when this is 
no longer possible—we have reached a Pareto optimal outcome. Now clearly we can 
do this with any of the different classes and thus have several different Pareto optimal 
outcomes; but as Rawls says, not all of these inequalities can be just or equally just. 
Distinct from Pareto optimality, the Difference Principle selects one groups 
in particular, the least advantaged (say, unskilled laborers—see Rawls, 1971, p. 
98), and allows the most advantaged to gain only when and so long as the least 
advantaged thereby also gain. “This principle [the difference principle] removes 
the indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency [Pareto optimality] by singling 
out a particular position [the least advantaged] from which the social and economic 
inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 75).
Pareto Optimality (efficiency) and the Difference Principle, are compatible. In the 
best case scenario, when all groups gain from inequalities both principles are satisfied; 
and, as Rawls says, we want both justice and efficiency. In circumstances when they 
conflict, justice has priority. The big question is whether, when we have both Pareto 
and the Difference Principle satisfied, the proviso that everyone gain from inequality 
is satisfied and we have just inequalities.
Now, as Brian Barry points out in his excellent discussion of the difference 
principle (Theories of Justice, 1989, pp. 226-34), if we had only two groups, the most 
and the least advantaged, and were considering departures from benchmark equality, 
then when the Difference Principle is satisfied so is the proviso that everyone gain 
from inequalities, since both groups gain from the inequality. And of course this 
inequality can be also Pareto optimal.
But when we have three or more relevant groups (Rawls has four, enterpreneurs, 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled), the difference principle itself does not, by itself, 
fully satisfy the proviso, that inequalities be to everyone’s advantage; since there may 
be, and usually are, other economic groups besides the most and the least advantaged, 
namely, any groups between them, and the difference principle by itself says nothing 
about them. Piketty, for example, divides all societies he investigates into four 
economic groups: the top one percent, the top ten percent, the next forty percent, 
and the remaining fifty percent; and his statistics are all about these four groups. He 
disarmingly admits there is some arbitrariness in this division, but that is likely true 
of any other divisions, and the most significant points in his statistics may not change 
much with other plausible divisions. Applied to Piketty’s groups, Rawls’s difference 
principle would allow the top one percent (or the top ten) to gain only when and so 
long as the bottom fifty percent also gain; and this clearly can happen without the 
middle class of the forty per cent also thereby gaining. 
Now Rawls is aware of the objection that the principle leaves out the middle 
economic group(s). This omission allows the possibility that the difference principle is 
satisfied (the top and bottom groups both gain), but the middle groups do not gain; and 
of course in this case clearly not all groups gain from the inequality. Rawls discusses 
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a circumstance (chain connection) in which “inequalities in expectations are chain 
connected: that is, if an advantage has the effect of raising the expectations of the 
lowest position, it raises the expectations of all positions in between.” (Rawls, 1971, 
p.80). Thus, if we joint the difference principle and chain connection, then when both 
are satisfied, the proviso that everyone gain from inequalities is also satisfied. However, 
Rawls is clear that chain connection (and  being “close-knit”—that all expectations 
move up or down together) are contingent matters, not part of the difference principle, 
and not built into the basic structure by his principles: “The difference principle is 
not contingent of these relations being satisfied.” (Rawls, P. 82) It seems clear, then, 
that even when all of Rawls’ principles are satisfied, it is a contingent matter whether 
everyone, strictly speaking, is benefited from the allowed inequalities. 
Thus an important objection to Rawls’ whole system might come from the so 
called middle class(es): Why does the difference principle, which governs the all-
important inequalities of income and wealth leave the middle classes out? Why should 
the least advantaged group be picked out for special attention (“a veto power, so to 
speak”)? Why should justice do this? 
Barry thinks that Rawls has an argument to answer this question (Barry, 1989, pp. 
231-34). Even when chain connection does not hold, as we move away from the initial 
benchmark equality toward inequalities that are to everyone’s advantage, then at the 
point at which the least advantaged can no longer benefit from further inequalities (the 
point at which the difference principle says this inequality is fair), the middle groups 
have no reasonable complaint because they are already more benefited by inequality 
than the least advantaged group (they continue to be above the least advantaged 
in income and/or wealth). Of course there may be some other inequality in which 
the middle groups benefit even more, but they still benefit from the inequality the 
difference principle selects (relative to benchmark equality) and they are still better 
than the worst off. This is of course an argument from the inside of Rawls’ position: it 
assumes the justice of the initial benchmark equality, and the idea that everyone must 
benefit from inequalities, and the idea that the just inequality is one that it would be 
rational for each and every party to agree to. 
From the outside, as it were, we can also construct an important reply, why the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society should be the deciding 
consideration in selecting the just inequality. The least advantaged are the least 
likely, perhaps the least able, to participate in the affairs of their society; they have 
the least, if any at all, participation in ruling, and the smallest voice, if any voice at 
all, in the affairs of the community that are everyone’s concern. Indeed, with the 
notable exception of ancient participatory democracies, in which, both Plato (Rep. 
VIII, 557) and Aristotle (Pol. III,8, 1280a) tell us, the poor ruled, we rarely if ever 
find the poor among the ruling classes, or even among those who actually vote, in 
modern representative democracies. Indeed, it seems that the opposite is true in such 
modern democracies: the rich rule or have undue influence on the rulers. J.S. Mill 
was worried about this very problem in 19nth century England: “the anomaly of a 
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democratic constitution in a predominantly plutocratically constituted society.” (W. 
Knight, 1897). Rawls’ difference principle gives the poor and under privileged a voice 
in the affairs of their country, a powerful voice because it is embeds promotion of their 
interest into the basic structure of a just society, into the very institutions of his well 
ordered society.
One might still complain about Rawls’ principles: why not find principles and 
institutions that require and insure that economic inequalities are literally and strictly 
to everyone’s advantage? Why pick out only two groups for attention? Why not 
build chain connection into the principles of justice, for example? We may have to 
look to the economists to tell us whether such a thing is possible and can ever be 
implemented. In modern democratic countries with free market economies, we seem 
to be at the very opposite of a Rawlsian society: it would seem that every economic 
trend and even every piece of legislation has both winners and losers. This is not even 
Pareto optimal, and far away from the difference principle.
And this problem occurs even with relevant groups being the atoms of the statistics 
of the economists and the principles of the philosophers. As Rawls concedes, there 
are many other groups that the citizens may be divided into, not to speak of taking 
individuals as the atoms: “We cannot have a coherent and manageable theory,” he says, 
“if we have to take such a multiplicity of positions into account. The assessment of 
so many competing claims is impossible.“ (Rawls, 1971, p. 96). Thus the satisfaction 
of all his principles does not assure that all groups whatsoever benefit from the just 
inequalities. And certainly not all individuals or all citizens. 
In Rawls’ theory, the relevant groups are chosen as those from whose point of view 
the justice of the basic structure is to be appraised. The claims of other groups are to 
be dealt at less general stages, such as constitutions and legislation; and the claims of 
individuals at the least abstract judicial stage (Rawls, 1971, Ch. IV, Section 31, The 
Four-Stage Sequence). Thus we must not suppose, simply and perhaps naively, that 
Rawls’ just inequalities benefit, or supposed to benefit, each and every citizen. But this 
complication, or apparently necessary simplification, is not confined to Rawls. Plato 
too makes a choice of relevant groups—those based on natural talents for relevant 
social needs, and judges the goodness and justice of his city from their point of view. 
And so do the economists work with relevant groups. Perhaps Rawls would claim that 
in his well-ordered just society, his justice at the basic structure, secured by the choice 
of his principles in the original position, would bring about more justice to the lower 
stages—constitutional conventions, legislatures, and courts—than other allegedly just 
basic structures. 
In sum, many contract theories would want to go beyond Pareto optimality, finding 
it insufficient to satisfy the proviso about inequalities being to everyone’s advantage, 
and so insufficient for economic justice. For such theories essentially include rational 
choice and free consent to principles of justice by ALL the participants in the society 
(or the representatives of the relevant groups): why would rational participants ALL 
chose and consent to arrangements which would leave some behind, as, say, Pareto 
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optimal inequalities would, when there is a departure from equality? Especially if 
they have other options? Rawls goes commendably beyond Pareto optimality. And 
of course his theory does rely on rational choice and agreement by ALL (unanimity 
is a procedural requirement in the Original Position) parties in the procedurally fair 
circumstances of the original position where principles of justice are chosen. How far 
his justice at the basic structure would assure justice for all groups whatsoever and all 
individuals at lower stages than the original position, such as choice of constitutions, 
choice of laws, and choice in courts, is not entirely clear even for his well ordered 
society. 
X. Institutions and Economic Justice
When it comes to institutions or general laws that can implement principles or 
policies designed to moderate economic inequalities so they are just, education and 
taxation are by far the most prominent.  
Public free education has been endorsed by many theorists of justice as a main 
institution that tempers or decreases economic inequalities, though the underlying 
principle of justice that would be used to justify free public education, may be different 
for different theorists. Plato in the Republic proposes an institution of public and free 
basic education for all the citizens in his ideal city; when conjoined with his allowing 
for some mobility among his three classes, on the basis that children can sometimes 
inherit different intelligence and other abilities from those of their parents (the Myth 
of the Metals), we can see that his public and free basic education for all can be a 
leveling influence on inequalities. His higher education of course is not for all but for 
the smartest few; and he takes drastic measure to limit their power to harm the ruled. 
Thomas Piketty argues that the “the principal force for convergence [the lessening 
of economic inequalities] – the diffusion of knowledge---… depends in large part 
on educational policies, access to training … and associated institutions.” (Capital, 
p. 22). He calls knowledge the “preeminent public good,” a non-exclusionary and 
non-competitive good (Paul Samuelson’s definition of a public good as non-exclusive 
and non-rivalrous).  And we saw that Rawls proposed that his important principle of 
fair equality of opportunity should be underwritten by free education for all. This is 
a principle of procedural justice, not a justice of outcomes, and free education for all 
is the procedure. (Rawls, 1971, pp. 83-90).  All these theorists regard education as “a 
public good”, a good to which everyone has access and no one is excluded and a good 
which is not- competitive. In many of our modern democracies basic education (the 
so called 12K) is public and free for all; but unfortunately higher education is not all 
public, much is not free, and some is prohibitively expensive (Piketty, 484-7).
Taxation is also regarded now days as capable of giving a helping hand to economic 
justice. Initially, one would suppose, the purpose of taxation was to cover the cost of 
government and defense. But more recently taxation has also been used to moderate 
great economic inequalities, e.g., estate taxes for the wealthy and “tax credits” for 
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low income groups. Rawls’ proposes a negative income tax as a way to satisfy the 
difference principle. Safety nets, social security, and medicare, are all used to help 
the less advantaged sectors of society, and they are all paid by one or another kind 
of tax. Piketty’s second main institutional proposal for moderating great economic 
inequalities, other than free public education, is indeed progressive taxation, mainly 
of wealth (see Piketty, Ch. 14, for significant data and analysis).    
XI   Democracy and Economic Justice 
Economic inequalities pose an especially painful problem for democracies, because 
democracies demand political equality but allow economic inequalities even though 
these tend to undermine the political equality of rights and liberty, more so the greater 
they are. This is largely because the exercise of political rights and freedoms requires 
resources. Even Aristotle, in his ideal constitution, what we might call an aristocratic 
democracy, recognized that the exercise of many virtues requires resources, and so 
his equality of participation in office would have implications for the distribution of 
relevant resources. Rawls recognizes the problem with his distinction between liberty 
and the worth of liberty, and his economic justice is supposed to address it (Rawsl, 
1971, p. 204f).
Unequal resources tend to lead to unequal exercise of political rights and freedoms; 
and if their exercise is greatly unequal, are they themselves equal? The equal right to 
travel, equal freedom of speech, the equal right to a fair trial—all these are evident 
examples that have been playing out for a long time. The rich can travel far more, they 
are far louder, and they can hire the best counsel to defend their rights and liberties 
(even after “Gideon’s Trumpet”). Democracies, ancient and modern, typically allow 
great inequalities in income and wealth, and refuse to apply the principles that require 
political equality to the economic basic structure of societies, presumably because of 
the greater efficiency of economic incentives and differences in economic merit. There 
is a tug of war, it seems, between political equalities and economic inequalities, and it 
seems to be especially painful for democracies which demand the first and allow the 
second. Even where there might be some agreement that economic inequalities must 
be constrained or regulated, at least for the sake of equal rights and freedoms, there 
is much disagreement about the limits or the principles underlying the regulations—
disagreements not likely to go away. Plato (and Aristotle) did not have this problem 
because they did not think of justice as equality to begin with in any domain, political, 
social, or economic. But of course they are left with the difficult and interesting 
problem of discovering what inequalities, in any domain, are just. 1
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Endnotes
1  I want to express my thanks to Professor Georgios Anagnostopoulos for many 
helpful discussions of the subjects of this essay, and to Professor Constantine Santas 
for many helpful editorial and substantial comments.
